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  11 
Abstract 12 
 13 
We population ecologists who are believed to be good at dealing with statistics often get confused 14 
about what kinds of statistical methods we should apply to our nuisance data.  There are a couple 15 
of conflicting paradigms and many associated methods in statistics.  Classical frequentists’ 16 
approaches that have dominated in science have been severely criticized by the newcomers: 17 
Bayesian and evidential statistics.  But, both newcomers also have weak points.  Researchers 18 
devoted to different statistical approaches are seeking soft landing places where they can 19 
compromise each other.  Key aspects of statistical inference are discriminating model selection 20 
and parameter estimation.  Likelihood and Fisher information play important roles in both 21 
processes.  As an overview of the compromise processes, here I will introduce three contributing 22 
papers by M. L. Taper, J. M. Ponciano, R. M. Dorazio, and K. Yamamura for the special issue 23 
entitled “Bayesian, Fisherian, error, and evidential statistical approaches for population ecology.”  24 
This special feature is based on a symposium held in Tsukuba, Japan, on 11 October 2014. 25 
 26 
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  30 
Introduction 31 
 32 
When a non-native-English-speaking scientist submits his/her manuscript to an international 33 
ecological journal, he/she often asks English proofreading of a professional or of his/her 34 
native-English-speaking colleague.  However, interestingly, there are few authorized systems to 35 
encourage proofreading of statistical methods.  One reason for this trend might be that statistical 36 
methods have no authorized standards as does scientific English.  Statistical practices, and in some 37 
cases paradigms, are quite different among scientific fields.  Population ecologists, who are 38 
believed to be relatively better at statistics than ecologists specializing in other fields, also have to 39 
consider which statistical methods and paradigms they should apply to their own researches.  Are 40 
we population ecologists actually good at statistics?  I would say no.  Most of us only specialize 41 
in specific statistical methods and paradigms. 42 
 That would be why Dr. Takashi Saitoh who was the president of the Society of 43 
Population Ecology asked Dr. Kohji Yamamura and myself to organize a special issue on statistics 44 
of population ecology from a broad perspective.  In this introductory review, I briefly list 45 
questions and concerns about statistics that I have felt during my career as a population ecologist.  46 
I first discuss the dominance of classical frequentist approaches in chronological order for which 47 
they appeared for me personally, then I briefly discuss the two newcomers, Bayesian and evidential 48 
statistics, and finally, I introduce the three contributing articles for this special issue.  This special 49 
feature is based on a symposium held in Tsukuba, Japan, on 11 October 2014. 50 
 51 
Dominance of classical frequentist approaches 52 
 53 
The vast majority of textbooks on statistics in the library of my university in the middle of the 54 
1980s were, and might still be, classified as classical frequentist statistics.  Here “classical 55 
frequentist” refers to non-Bayesian or non-evidential, and mainly consists of null-hypothesis testing 56 
and P-value worship approaches that assume normal distributions of original or transformed target 57 
variables.  As other students of population ecology, I had to start learning classical statistics when 58 
I was a graduate student.  I have always wondered why regressions and ANOVA-type methods 59 
have two steps: significance tests of explanatory variables for the data variation as a whole 60 
followed by significance tests for parameters or means of sub-units.  Even for a simple one-way 61 
ANOVA test for three categories, once we detect a significant difference among the three categories, 62 
we cannot simply claim that the largest mean value for a category is larger than those of the other 63 
two categories.  I was taught that we had to perform appropriate post hoc tests even when the plot 64 
of mean values clearly showed the difference. 65 
 The former step is model fitting, and the latter one is parameter estimation.  These two 66 
steps sometimes invoke different statistical methods, e.g., model fitting with information criteria, 67 
such AIC or BIC, and parameter estimation with Bayesian methods.  The former requires post hoc 68 
tests to compare parameters of the best models, but the latter can spontaneously compare multiple 69 
parameters after obtaining their posterior probabilities by checking the overlap of their posterior 70 
distributions.  Post hoc tests are a variant of multiple comparison (Hsu 1998).  Multiple 71 
comparison per se does not inherently mean post hoc tests, and there are relevant a priori tests of 72 
multiple comparison.  The difference between post hoc and a priori comparison is the 73 
epistemological attitude towards data collection by researchers.  If one designed the comparison 74 
before his/her data collection, the test is a priori but it should be treated as post hoc if one did the 75 
comparison after his/her data collection.  This epistemological difference would affect the 76 
complicatedness of calculating appropriate variances in the comparison.  Much simpler methods 77 
of post hoc comparison, for example the Bonferroni test or its variants (Holm 1979; Moran 2003), 78 
often require some kind of programming skills, so one would preferably be able to claim, “I did 79 
design the comparison beforehand!” 80 
 My supervisor, Dr. Koichi Fujii, mastered statistics under Dr. Robert R. Sokal who is the 81 
author of the famous textbook, Biometry (Sokal and Rohlf 1981), which has a good flavor of 82 
classical statistics.  My friends believed that I would become an obedient successor of this 83 
“normal distribution empire.”  Then Dr. Nobuhiro Minaka who taught statistics at various 84 
institutes and universities at that time, secretly sent me his image of a statistical mandala at the end 85 
of the 1980s (Fig. 1).  I was very excited about this mandala because with it I learned that there 86 
were options other than the “normal distribution empire.”  Moreover, those other options were 87 
extremely attractive.  After that, Dr. Mark L. Taper visited my laboratory as a post-doctoral fellow 88 
of the National Science Foundation, U.S.A., and introduced me to the bossa nova of statistics.  At 89 
the time, besides discriminating egg shapes of two bean beetle species (Taper and Ponciano 2015), 90 
Dr. Taper was struggling with quantitative genetic problems using MANOVA (Taper 1990).  He 91 
was always aware of the statistical power of constructed statistical models.  He often questioned 92 
me about how many replicates we needed to obtain significant differences among treatments 93 
considering statistical power.  He recommended that I read a textbook by Dr. Jerrold H. Zar (Zar 94 
1984) rather than Biometory (Sokal and Rohlf 1981).  Zar’s book (2nd ed.) was, as far as I knew, 95 
the only book that started the first chapter with frequency data analysis, which taught me the 96 
meaning of degrees of freedom. 97 
 At the beginning of the 1990s, there was a small boom of randomization statistics 98 
(Noreen 1989; Good 1993; Edgington 1995; Manly 1997) among young behavioral ecologists in 99 
Japan.  Dr. Eiichi Kasuya and his collaborators claimed, “from now on, randomization will take 100 
over those classical statistics such as ANOVA and multiple regressions.”  They emphasized that 101 
randomization methods were custom made, so we could adjust statistics so as to ask any question 102 
and judge any problems.  Randomization tests were first innovated by Dr. Ronald A. Fisher 103 
(Salsburg 2001) and extensively developed by Dr. Bradley Efron (Efron 1982; Hall 1992) as the 104 
Jackknife, bootstrap, and other resampling methods for reconstructing parameter distribution of 105 
populations.  One can reconstruct the background distribution believed to exist by simply or 106 
honestly resampling obtained data.  It is just like believing that nature is full of fractals (Peitgen 107 
1992).  Resampling plans need sophisticated stratification of variables if you have problems with 108 
multiple variables.  I was not sure how to apply randomization tests to all of the statistical 109 
problems illustrated in Dr. Minaka’s mandala (Fig. 1). 110 
 In the middle of the 1990s, many population ecologists in Japan routinely used 111 
generalized linear models (GLM; e.g., Dunteman 1984; Dobson 1990; Crawley 1993) for their 112 
analyses.  They fit models to their data, and examined parameter values for the models.  Some 113 
models showed quite low powers of explanation, or had low adjusted or generalized determination 114 
coefficient (R2) values (Nagelkerke 1991), but their discussions were based on highly significant 115 
parameters of the models.  Some researchers applied information criteria, such AIC and its 116 
variants, but again they derived conclusions from significant parameters even though there might 117 
have been alternative models with similar AIC values.  Model selection and the following 118 
parameter summarization were somehow estranged from one another. 119 
 Significance tests for parameters often ask whether the parameter values are greater or 120 
less than zero.  We all know the criticisms against the silly null hypothesis that reflect a lack of 121 
thinking about plausible alternatives, so finding little/no support for the nulls does little to provide 122 
evidence for the alternatives (Burnham et al. 2011).  So we perhaps forget the criticisms when we 123 
perform GLMs.  Earnest population ecologists are aware of random effects as well as fixed effects, 124 
but decisions on whether factors are fixed or random effects are often arbitrary (Royle and Dorazio 125 
2008). Not a few articles encourage scientists to get rid of P-values and testing between null-model 126 
and non-null-model hypotheses (e.g., Anderson et al. 2000; Stephens et al. 2005).  Recently the 127 
scientific journal, “Basic and Applied Social Psychology,” has gone so far as to ban P-value 128 
significance tests (Trafimow and Marks 2015)!  But many scientific articles still adopt classical 129 
statistical methods.  This situation resembles that of Mac and Linux users blaming Windows 130 
because of its inability to stop malware proliferation, while at the same time, Windows users make 131 
up the vast majority of the world’s computer-using population. 132 
 133 
Bossa-nova statistics from bayesian and evidential approaches 134 
 135 
Bayesian approaches are the most recent trend for population ecology (e.g., Ellison 2004; Qian and 136 
Shen 2007).  As for randomization methods, evangelists of Bayesian statistics claimed that 137 
“everything is solved with Bayesian” (e.g., Albert 2007; McCarthy 2007; Gill 2008).  Several 138 
Bayesian introductory textbooks criticize classical approaches, sometimes even consuming an 139 
entire chapter, and introduce Bayesian methods as a replacement for all of them (e.g., McCarthy 140 
2007; McGrayne 2011).  Some extremist opinions claim that Bayesian philosophy cannot coexist 141 
with classical philosophy (e.g., Ellison 2004).  There was, in fact, stubborn resistance against 142 
Bayesian approaches from old schools of thought (e.g., Yamamura 2015).  Students would ask, 143 
“well, we can obtain posterior distribution of target parameters, but how can we say those 144 
parameters are significantly different from zero?”  Some textbooks even introduce significance 145 
tests in terms of Bayesian approaches (e.g., Albert 2007).  “Then which model should we select?” 146 
is another question.  Bayes factor, DIC and BIC have been proposed, but there exist pros and cons 147 
for each of them (Ward 2008; Spiegelhalter et al. 2014; Hooten and Hobbs 2015).  On the other 148 
hand, there are more moderate Bayesian evangelists that would not mind combining Bayesian with 149 
other, even classical, approaches (e.g., Bolker 2008; Royle and Dorazio 2008; Qian 2010). 150 
 As the rise of randomization approaches heavily depended on advances in computer 151 
sciences, new and practical Bayesian approaches, such Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC, 152 
Dorazio 2015) and Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (Stan Development Team 2015) have been enabled by 153 
progress in calculation techniques with computers.  Development of Bayesian-statistics-oriented 154 
languages, such OpenBUGS, WinBUGS, JAGS, and Stan, also accelerated the spread of Bayesian 155 
approaches (Kruschke 2011; Kery and Schaub 2012; Stan Development Team 2015).  After 156 
copying BUGS scripts from books, adjusting parameters for prior probability of one's data, and 157 
then calculating the statistical scripts, posterior distributions are returned.  It is often 158 
recommended to check states of convergence of the posterior distribution by trace plots or 𝑅𝑅� 159 
values (Gelman and Rubin1992), but those checks do not guarantee parameter convergence 160 
(Dorazio 2015). 161 
 Evidential statistical approaches appear more modest in propagation than Bayesian and 162 
other approaches (Taper and Lele 2004).  They mainly rely on the invariant characteristic of 163 
maximum likelihood or variants of information criteria, and provide simple but clear ways to tell 164 
which models should be selected.  Interestingly, all the following tools were invented by Dr. 165 
Fisher: P-value, randomization test, ANOVA, and maximum likelihood estimates.  Dr. Fisher 166 
himself strongly criticized Bayesian approaches (e.g., McGrayne 2011), but evidential approaches 167 
seek a harmonious collaboration with Bayesian methods as well as with classical methods.  So far 168 
there seems not to have been any big booms in evidential approaches in Japan or in other regions of 169 
the world. 170 
 171 
Walking through Bayesian, Fisherian, error, and evidential statistical approaches 172 
 173 
Dr. Minaka’s mandala (Fig. 1) shows us nearly the whole scope of statistics that we population 174 
ecologists should be aware of.  I felt that a more simplified version of the mandala could be drawn.  175 
A similar trial was done by Dr. Efron who categorizes himself as a Fisherian (Efron 1998, Fig. 2), 176 
but here I would like to propose an even simpler mandala (Fig. 3).  The horizontal line in Fig. 3 177 
shows the one-dimensional problem space of statistics.  The shaded rectangle shows the domain 178 
of classical methods, or “normal distribution empire.”  Yes, there are many problems outside of 179 
the rectangle: On the left-hand side, the amount of data is too small to apply a t-test or an ANOVA.  180 
On the right-hand side, we have plenty of data, but they are too entangled to apply a simple 181 
ANOVA or even a MANOVA.  So, for situations represented by the left-hand side, proper 182 
guidance would be, “collect more data!”  How much data is necessary to shift into the gray 183 
rectangle region?  And, what about situations in which, we cannot collect more data?  184 
Non-parametric methods, and sometimes Bayesian methods, are often invoked to support small 185 
sample sizes (e.g., Hinton 2004). Note that neither non-parametric nor Bayesian methods were 186 
invented for that purpose (Neave and Worthington 1988; Noether 1991; Sprent 1993; Salsburg 187 
2001). 188 
 The problem is more serious if your data are located on the right-hand side of the shaded 189 
rectangle in Fig. 3.  Explanatory variables are complicatedly correlated, and variables to be 190 
explained are also highly entangled.  Applying classification methods, such cluster analyses and 191 
correspondence analyses, may reveal distant relationships among the variables, but some criteria 192 
for grouping them are necessary.  The proper guidance for such situations is merely “muddle 193 
through whatever tools you have!” (Taper and Ponciano 2015).  One way of “muddling through” 194 
might be to construct hierarchical models with the Bayesian method or variants of GLM methods.  195 
But still one should be aware of the non-identifiability problem (Raue et al. 2013).  MCMC 196 
methods are so powerful, and output tentative posterior probability of parameters; however this 197 
may be scientifically nonsensical (see Dorazio 2015; Taper and Ponciano 2015). 198 
 This Special Feature is another, albeit non-visualized and rather verbal, mandala.  You 199 
have to read through it, but after that, you will be able to visualize your own image in order to solve 200 
your statistical problems.  In this Special Feature, we have three contributing papers by four 201 
statistics experts from different disciplines: Dr. Mark L. Taper and Dr. José M. Ponciano from 202 
evidential statistics, Dr. Robert M. Dorazio from Bayesian statistics, and Dr. Kohji Yamamura from 203 
Fisherian statistics. 204 
 Dr. Taper and Dr. Ponciano first overview different statistical approaches: Fisherian, 205 
Bayesian, error, and evidential, in terms of population ecology.  Their long introduction shows 206 
conflicts among the approaches from methodological as well as philosophical points of view.  207 
Then, they discuss the evidential statistical approach in depth.  This explanation might be a good 208 
place to start for those have never heard the name, “evidential statistical approach.”  The final 209 
section is a detailed list of misunderstandings and confusion of statistics in general, with which 210 
population ecologists will no doubt be confronted at some point in their research.  Readers might 211 
be willing to compare these comments with previous ones from different points of view (e.g., 212 
Burnham et al. 2011). 213 
Dr. Dorazio demonstrates contemporary views and attitudes of Bayesian approaches.  214 
Based on the learning aspects of Bayesian approaches, he tries to persuade us that “hierarchical 215 
modeling” is an engine for current research in the field of population ecology.  He strongly 216 
recommends Bayesian approaches as a first-choice method.  He is not a fanatical Bayesian 217 
evangelist at all, and discusses the pros and cons of Bayesian approaches.  In particular, he admits 218 
that the weakness in choosing prior probability and model comparison has not yet been solved 219 
solely within Bayesian approaches, and hence, he recommends combinations with other statistical 220 
approaches for those issues.  He also provides brief but lucid explanations of MCMC techniques, 221 
which most users of Bayesian software packages leave them as black-boxes.  His examples are 222 
very useful and practical even for Bayesian beginners. 223 
 Dr. Yamamura describes himself as a Fisherian rather than a frequentist.  He has 224 
repeatedly claimed in academic meetings that “Bayesian estimates can be used as an approximation 225 
to maximum likelihood (ML) estimates,” which becomes the title of his article.  His main 226 
criticism of Bayesian approaches is the mal-effects of inappropriate prior probabilities of 227 
parameters.  He then proposes a Bayesian approximation of objective ML with appropriate 228 
transformation that makes the posterior distribution close to a normal one.  He explains his idea, 229 
named as “empirical Jeffreys prior,” with a practical example of sika deer populations in Hokkaido, 230 
Japan.  The approximation method is, as Dr. Taper has repeatedly indicated, believed to have a 231 
tight relationship with data cloning (Lele et al. 2007). 232 
 After reading through the above three articles, I am convinced that readers will have a 233 
better understanding of what model selection is and of what parameter estimation is, as well as 234 
learn what kinds of tools, such ML and Bayesian procedures, have been implemented for those 235 
purposes.  Discriminating as well as properly combining (not confusing) these two aspects will 236 
work as a compass as readers “muddle through” the mandalas of statistics. 237 
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Figure Legends 330 
 331 
Figure 1.  Minaka’s statistical mandala.  This image is recreated from Dr. Nobuhiro Minaka’s 332 
original one posted at http://cse.niaes.affrc.go.jp/minaka/R/images/Mandala2004-large.jpg. 333 
 334 
Figure 2.  Efron’s statistical mandala.  For each aspect, the sitting place of Dr. Fisher indicates 335 
the position of the Fisherian between Bayesian and frequentist.  This image is recreated from Fig. 336 
1 in Efron (1998). 337 
 338 
Figure 3.  A simplified statistical mandala.  The horizontal axis indicates a statistical space that 339 
ranges from small/simple to large/complex.  The shaded rectangle shows the domain of the 340 
normal distribution empire.  Statistical problems often lie outside of the shaded rectangle. 341 
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